War & military technology
An editorial selection for comparing processes, events, and lives. The interval and counts describe selected records, not the historical boundaries or importance of the subject.
- Canonical records
- 123
- Events
- 35
- People
- 7
- Processes and periods
- 81
Topics represented
British Empire (68) · War & military technology (55) · Resistance & colonized agency (47) · War & conquest (40) · Colonization & sovereignty (30) · Law & imperial government (24) · Decolonization & independence (20) · Slavery & coerced labor (18) · Companies, trade & extraction (14) · Doctrina (14) · Logística (13) · Indigenous peoples & dispossession (13)
View distribution by region and period
| Region | Before 3000 BCE | 3000–1 BCE | 1–1499 | 1500–1799 | 1800–1899 | 1900–1999 | Since 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Africa | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 13 | 10 | 1 |
| Americas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 5 |
| Asia | 0 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 11 | 26 | 3 |
| Europe | 0 | 4 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 14 | 3 |
| Oceania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Global / no specific region | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 |
Records and sources
Ordered by start date. Long lives and processes may begin before the period you want to study.
1942
The fall of Singapore shatters the myth of invulnerabilityBritish, Indian, Australian, and local forces surrendered to Japan after the Malayan campaign. Japanese occupation was brutal for local communities, but the defeat also shattered claims of British military and racial superiority and transformed Southeast Asian nationalisms
1942
Congress demands immediate British withdrawalThe Quit India resolution called for an immediate end to British rule. Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Azad, and other leaders were arrested before organizing the campaign, but strikes, sabotage, and parallel governments appeared across regions; repression killed and imprisoned thousands, with totals disputed
1942–1945
Manhattan Project, nuclear weapons, and emergent deterrenceFrom 1942, the Manhattan Engineer District organized a secret infrastructure bringing together science, industry, labour, and military command to produce the first nuclear weapons. Their use in 1945 opened an unprecedented strategic problem; nuclear deterrence developed as a system and doctrinal language chiefly after the war, so this entry treats it here as an emerging possibility, not an already settled doctrine or a sole explanation for the war’s end.
1943–1944
The Bengal famine exposes wartime prioritiesMillions died in Bengal in a crisis shaped by lost imports, inflation, military procurement, distribution failure, “denial” policies, delayed relief, and crop damage. Estimates commonly range from two to three million, but the total and the weight of each cause remain debated
c. 1945–c. 1991
Nuclear deterrence and the mutual-assured-destruction debateDuring the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union organized nuclear forces to retain retaliatory capacity and deter a first strike. The term “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) described a family of ideas about reciprocal vulnerability and force survivability, not an identical doctrine accepted in the same way by both governments or a guarantee of peace. Crises, accidents, command arrangements, incomplete information, and arms control exposed its limits and risks.
c. 1945–c. 1976
Maoist people’s war as a postwar referenceMao’s writings on guerrilla and protracted war, written before 1945 and applied in specific Chinese circumstances, remained a reference for postwar insurgent debates. They articulated political organization, social support, mobility, and gradual transformation of forces, not a technical recipe separable from revolutionary aims and local conditions. Later movements selected, reinterpreted, or rejected those ideas; not all were Maoist and no insurgency depended simply on China.
c. 1945–c. 1954
Viet Minh: logistics, territorial organization, and combat forcesIn Indochina’s decolonization war, the Viet Minh combined political and territorial organization with transport and supply networks, guerrillas, and larger-scale units. Its trajectory shows that insurgencies could formulate and sustain their own logistical and command capacities, rather than merely evade state forces. The particular combination varied by region and phase of the war, and does not make its experience a universal model or erase Vietnamese political diversity.
1946
Indian naval ratings mutiny in Bombay and other portsA dispute over food, racist treatment, and service conditions spread from HMIS Talwar to ships and shore establishments in several cities. Workers’ strikes supported the ratings; Congress and Muslim League leaders urged surrender, but the scale exposed disaffection within the Raj’s armed forces
1947
Independence arrives with PartitionThe Independence Act created the dominions of India and Pakistan while commissions chaired by Cyril Radcliffe divided Punjab and Bengal at great speed. Partition produced one of history’s largest mass migrations and communal, state and paramilitary violence; Imperial War Museums places disputed death estimates between 200,000 and one million
1947–1948
UN partition, mandate’s end, Israel, and NakbaThe UN recommended partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states with an internationalized Jerusalem. Britain ended the mandate on 14 May 1948 without implementing an agreed transition; Israel’s creation and war accompanied the flight and expulsion of roughly 750,000 Palestinians, a widely used estimate rather than an exact count
1948–1960
Counterinsurgency and resettlement in the Malayan EmergencyThe Malayan Communist Party’s guerrillas fought colonial and later independent government. The Briggs Plan isolated insurgents through food controls, detention, and relocation of nearly half a million rural residents, chiefly Chinese, into “New Villages”; independence in 1957 preceded the emergency’s end
1952–1960
The Kenya Emergency fights the Mau Mau uprisingThe Kenya Land and Freedom Army, associated chiefly with Kikuyu communities, fought over land and colonial rule. The state detained, interrogated, and relocated hundreds of thousands, executed more than a thousand convicted people, and imposed villages; insurgents also killed Africans and Europeans. Records and totals remain incomplete and disputed
1952–1963
British nuclear tests at Monte Bello, Emu Field and MaralingaWith the agreement and support of the Australian government, the United Kingdom conducted nuclear trials at the Monte Bello Islands, Emu Field and Maralinga between 1952 and 1963. Tests and experiments contaminated lands inhabited by Aboriginal peoples, especially Anangu and Maralinga Tjarutja communities, and also exposed service personnel. The 1985 McClelland Royal Commission criticized protection of Indigenous people and safety management, revealing how a postcolonial military relationship preserved hierarchies and shifted risks onto local communities
c. 1953–c. 1962
The R-7 ICBM and intercontinental nuclear deliveryThe Soviet Union authorized development of the R-7 in 1953; its 1957 tests and use as Sputnik’s launcher showed the connection between space rocketry and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The arrival of ICBMs shortened warning time and linked deterrence to alerting, command, and defence, but the early R-7 had vulnerabilities and limited deployment. A missile system alone did not amount to decision-making capacity, intelligence, or secure control.
1954–1962
FLN-ALN insurgent organization in AlgeriaDuring the Algerian war of independence, the National Liberation Front and its National Liberation Army developed guerrilla units and a politico-administrative organization for mobilization, propaganda, information, and resources. This organizational agency was neither homogeneous nor free of competition, coercion, and fractures within the movement and Algerian society. The entry does not present the struggle as a replica of Asian models or reduce independence to a military outcome.
c. 1954–c. 1962
“Guerre révolutionnaire” and French counterinsurgencyAfter the Indochina and Algerian wars, some French officers developed *guerre révolutionnaire*, understanding irregular conflict as political, psychological, and military struggle. This doctrine influenced international counterinsurgency exchanges, but was not one single French policy or a manual able to resolve the colonial causes of conflict. Its practices and effects, including the human and political costs of repression, must be distinguished from its own doctrinal claims.
1956
Nationalization and invasion expose British declineGamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal company; Britain, France, and Israel coordinated an invasion under a secret pretext. Pressure from the United States, United Nations, and financial markets forced withdrawal. Egypt kept the canal, and the crisis discredited Britain’s capacity to act as an autonomous imperial power
c. 1959–c. 1967
Guevara and guerrilla doctrine in the AmericasAfter the Cuban Revolution, Ernesto Che Guevara published a reflection on guerrilla warfare that influenced debates among revolutionary movements, especially in Latin America. The text linked irregular combat to a political project and held that a guerrilla without popular support was bound to fail. Its circulation does not demonstrate uniform adoption or success: local actors, rural and urban conditions, social support, repression, and international decisions produced very different outcomes.
1963–1967
Insurgency, British withdrawal and South Yemeni independenceFrom 1963, the National Liberation Front and FLOSY fought British rule and each other during the Aden Emergency. The Aden, Perim and Kuria Muria Islands Act supplied the legal basis for relinquishing colonial sovereignty, while rapid political deterioration brought forward the intended withdrawal. British rule ended on 29 November 1967 and the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen was born the next day under the NLF; the sequence shows decolonization driven by local insurgency as well as London’s strategic decisions
1965
Divergent outcomes in Gambia, Singapore, Rhodesia, and ChagosGambia and Singapore became sovereign; in Rhodesia, Ian Smith’s white-minority government issued a unilateral declaration to prevent majority rule. Britain detached Chagos from Mauritius and Aldabra, Farquhar, and Desroches from Seychelles to create BIOT, on the eve of independence and without consulting Chagossians
1965–1980
From Rhodesia’s UDI to Zimbabwean independenceIn 1965 Ian Smith’s white-minority government unilaterally declared Southern Rhodesia independent to avoid an immediate transition to majority rule. Britain rejected the UDI’s validity and legislated sanctions while a liberation war pitted the regime against ZANU and ZAPU. The Lancaster House agreement briefly restored British authority so elections could be held; the Zimbabwe Act appointed 18 April 1980 for independence with Robert Mugabe as prime minister
c. 1967–c. 1972
CORDS and U.S. support for pacification in South VietnamFrom 1967, CORDS coordinated U.S. civilian and military components advising and supporting the South Vietnamese government’s pacification program. It illustrates a counterinsurgency variant linking security, administration, and development under wartime conditions, not a merely technical response to guerrilla warfare. Local capacities and priorities, contested legitimacy, violence, and opponents’ organization limited and transformed its implementation.
1968–1973
Chagossians are removed to make way for a military baseBritish authorities prevented returns and removed Chagos’s population, mainly to Mauritius and Seychelles, while closing plantations and enabling a US base on Diego Garcia. Official documents falsely characterized permanent inhabitants as transient workers; displacement and its intergenerational harms remain the subject of litigation and protest
1982
Argentina and the United Kingdom fight over the disputed islandsArgentina’s junta occupied the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, claimed by both states, and Britain sent a naval task force that retook them after ten weeks. The war killed 649 Argentine and 255 British service personnel and three island civilians. It did not resolve sovereignty: islanders assert self-determination and Argentina maintains its territorial claim
1991
Gulf War air campaign and guided munitionsThe 1991 coalition air campaign combined stealth aircraft, sensors, cruise missiles, and laser-guided munitions with extensive planning, bases, maintenance, intelligence, and allied support. It made precision-guided munitions especially visible in later military debates, but was not a demonstration of unlimited precision or of airpower alone resolving war: target selection, information, defences, weather, civilian effects, and ground operations remained consequential.
c. 1991–c. 2010
The “revolution in military affairs” debateAfter 1991, analysts and military establishments debated whether information networks, sensors, precision munitions, and new organizations were producing a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). The concept encouraged reforms and expectations of situational knowledge and stand-off attack, but remained contested: technology, doctrine, force structure, adversaries, and political objectives do not change at the same pace. The label is neither a historiographical consensus nor an automatic predictor of outcomes in later conflicts.
c. 2001–c. 2010
Expansion of military and security contractors in Iraq and AfghanistanOperations in Iraq and Afghanistan expanded U.S. reliance on contractors for transport, construction, base support, analysis, training, and armed security. The expansion did not create military contracting from nothing or cover all employers and countries equally; it did make oversight, jurisdiction, rules on the use of force, and relationships with local populations visible operational and political questions. Incidents and responsibility must be assessed case by case.
c. 2010–c. 2025
Armed remotely piloted aircraft: use and legal-operational debateIn the 2010s, armed remotely piloted aircraft became prominent in state operations and in debates over target selection, command chains, transparency, and the application of international law. The United Nations report stresses that remote control does not remove legal obligations. This entry does not assess particular campaigns or assume that a platform alone determines precision, legality, accountability, or strategic outcomes.
2010
Stuxnet disclosure and malware against industrial control systemsIn 2010, technical advisories documented Stuxnet and mitigations for Siemens industrial-control environments. The case showed that malicious software could interact with physical industrial systems and accelerated debates on cybersecurity, sabotage, and interstate conflict. Public attribution, exact targets, and strategic effects do not follow from the technical advisory alone; this entry avoids assigning responsibility or making the episode the definitive “first” case of cyberwar.
c. 2013–c. 2025
“Gerasimov doctrine”: label and historiographical debateAfter a 2013 text by Valery Gerasimov on changes in warfare, some Western analysis popularized the label “Gerasimov doctrine.” A *Military Review* study cautions that the text can be read as reflection and an invitation to study future war, not as the proclamation of a new Russian doctrine or a single operational plan. This entry retains the label to make its circulation visible, but does not use it to explain policies, operations, or ongoing conflicts in a totalizing way.